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You have just arrived at the airport in Manchester, England with three traveling companions and are looking for a taxi to take you to the local train station. You already have tickets for the train ride to London, which is 200 miles away. You approach the taxi stand, where a group of drivers are sitting around chatting. Business seems slow, and the drivers appear to know each other quite well. You request the short ride to the train station. One of drivers tells you that the trains are on strike and offers to drive the four of you to London for 300 pounds. Do you accept?
Notice that this offer leaves you vulnerable to making at least one of two obvious possible mistakes. First, you could accept the offer and later find out that the strike claim was fraudulent. This is likely to make you feel quite cheated. On the other hand, you could reject the offer and seek additional information elsewhere. If the claim was truthful, however, it might be a bit awkward for you to return to the taxi stand and repeat your request for a ride. Are you the type of person who is more likely to be taken for a ride due to naiveté, or someone who is more likely to create an awkward situation due to your cynicism? In other words, are you more likely to trust too much or too little?
In fact, one of the authors of this paper was the focal actor in this story. As one of the group members was about to accept the offer of a ride to London, the author said to another member of the group, "Don't let him load the luggage yet." The author ran into the airport, up to the information booth, and quickly asked whether there was a train strike. Running back to the taxi stand, he pulled his three friends aside with the news that there was no strike: the driver's claim was a scam. Cynicism carried the day.
Trust, on the other hand, played an instrumental role in another one of the author's travels. Through the non-profit online social network CouchSurfing.org, she was able to connect 4 with travelers and stay with local hosts in twenty-eight countries, who welcomed her to their homes upon meeting her for the first time. Not only did the hosts provide her with couches to sleep on, but many prepared home-cooked meals for her, accompanied her on day-long tours of their cities, and yes, even picked her up from the airport-all at no cost to the author. The more cynical among us might probe to understand why people would behave so generously toward a stranger, but consider that more than two million people worldwide have found hosts through CouchSurfing.org. Given an ample dose of trust from both guests and hosts, the network creates value by connecting travelers with otherwise empty couches and fostering authentic cultural exchanges and experiences.
This paper is about the decision errors we make in competitive contexts when we are naïve, as well as those we make when we are too cynical-which, we will argue, are opposite sides of the same problem. People often face a choice between trusting the other party and being cynical of their motives (Kramer & Lewicki, 2010) . But the "naïve versus cynical" distinction is broader than issues involving trust or personality. After all, people can be naïve without invoking the issue of trust, and most of us have been guilty of both being naïve and of being too cynical in different contexts. We describe naïve behavior as a failure to act optimally due to a lack of consideration of the strategic and behavioral perspectives of others. In contrast, we describe someone as being too cynical when their suspicions hamper their own welfare. Of course, it is often hard to know when one is being naïve or too cynical, but experimentally, we hope to identify the triggers of each type of mistake. This paper offers a more complete review of the evidence of these dysfunctional patterns and then explores strategies for managing them.
NAÏVE ERRORS
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Much more is known about naïve behavior than about cynical behavior. One illustrative problem was first presented by Samuelson and Bazerman (1985) . If you have not seen it before, please think through the "Acquiring a Company" problem before proceeding:
In the following exercise, you will represent Company A (the acquirer), which is currently considering acquiring Company T (the target) by means of a tender offer. You plan to tender in cash for 100 percent of Company T's shares but are unsure how high a price to offer. The main complication is this: the value of Company T depends directly on the outcome of a major oil exploration project it is currently undertaking. Indeed, the very viability of Company T depends on the exploration outcome. If the project fails, the company under current management will be worth nothing -$0/share. But if the project succeeds, the value of the company under current management could be as high as $100/share. All share values between $0 and $100 are considered equally likely. By all estimates, the company will be worth considerably more in the hands of Company A than under current management. In fact, whatever the ultimate value under current management, The essential features of the "Acquiring a Company" problem are that a) the acquirer is uncertain about the ultimate value of the target firm, knowing only that its value under current management is between $0 and $100, with all values equally likely; b) the firm is expected to be worth 50 percent more under the acquirer's management than under the current ownership; and c) only the target will know its true value when accepting or rejecting the offer. What is the most rational offer?
Most people respond naïvely (in the sense defined above) when answering this question, and not because of a lack of trust. The arithmetic needed to solve the problem is simple, yet naïve thinking gets it wrong. The dominant response of 123 MBA students from Boston University in the early 1980s was between $50 and $75, and is naïvely consistent with the fact that, on average, the firm will be worth $50 to the target and $75 to the acquirer. Why is this thinking naïve? 7 Because the other side does not randomly accept any offer presented; rather, they accept an offer selectively. This can be seen by a more rational assessment of an offer of $60 per share (Samuelson & Bazerman, 1985) :
If I offer $60 per share, the offer will be accepted 60 percent of the time-whenever the firm is worth between $0 and $60 to the target. Since all values are equally likely, between $0 and $60, the firm will, on average, be worth $30 per share to the acquirer, resulting in a loss of $15 per share ($45 to $60). Consequently, a $60 per share offer is unwise.
This logic applies to any positive offer. On average, the acquirer obtains a company worth 25 percent less than its offer when that offer is accepted. In other words, when the acquirer offers $X and the target accepts, the value to the target is worth anywhere between $0 and $X. Any value in that range is equally likely, and the expected value of the offer is therefore equal to $X/2. With the 50 percent premium to the acquirer, the acquirer's expected value is 1.5($X/2) = 0.75($X), or 75 percent of its offer price.
Thus, the optimal offer is $0, or a decision to make no offer at all. Paradoxically, even though in all circumstances the firm is worth more to the acquirer than to the target, any offer above $0 leads to a negative expected return to the acquirer, twice the chance of losing money as gaining money, and a maximum potential loss that is twice as large as the maximum potential gain.
"The source of this paradox lies in the high likelihood that the target will accept the acquirer's offer when the firm is least valuable to the acquirer-that is, when it is a 'lemon' (Akerlof, 1970) ," note Samuelson and Bazerman (1985) .
Replications with MBA students and executive students at the Sloan School at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Kellogg School at Northwestern, and the Harvard 8 Business School have produced similar results. CEOs, investment bankers, and audit partners faired little better (Bazerman & Moore, 2008) . Even when subjects were paid according to their performance and played multiple trials with feedback on their offers, the same pattern of errors persists (Ball, Bazerman, & Carroll, 1991; Grosskopf, Bereby-Meyer, & Bazerman, 2007; BerebyMeyer & Grosskopf, 2008) .
Most MBA students and professors can easily follow the logic that the optimal offer is $0 per share, yet most make a positive offer when given the problem. This naïve behavior reflects the systematic exclusion of the conditional acceptance by the other party. That is, we fail to think through the future decisions of other parties. In addition, we tend to over-rely on the outcomes of previous rounds of financial investment decisions (Bereby-Meyer & Grosskopf, 2008) and assume that others have the same limited information that we do (Carroll, Bazerman, & Maury, 1988) .
Many other examples of naïve decision-making behavior abound and have been welldocumented in competitive realms ranging from negotiations to economic games to auctions. At a more fundamental level, the focusing bias causes us to attend only to specific items or events (Schkade & Kahneman, 1998; Wilson et al., 2000) or what is explicitly represented in our mental models (Legrenzi, Girotto, & Johnson-Laird, 1993) . We excluded important information from our decisions, including others' choices and the consequences of those choices, and fail to adjust our behavior accordingly (Grosskopf, Bereby-Meyer, & Bazerman, 2007) . In one study, by failing to consider how the rules of a negotiation affected others in addition to themselves, negotiators passed on options that would have resulted in strategic benefits (Moore, 2004) . Our insensitivity to others' cognitions and decisions may result in suboptimal performance in competitive settings as a result of focusing too narrowly on problems and overweighting one's own perspective (Babcock & 9 Loewenstein, 1997; Bazerman & Chugh, 2006; Idson, Chugh, Bereby-Meyer, Moran, Grosskopf, & Bazerman, 2004; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992) . Naïve errors may also occur when we err by trusting others who have self-serving motives (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995) . In the example of the Monty Hall Problem (derived from the TV game show "Let's Make a Deal"), host Monty Hall would ask a contestant to pick one of three doors, one of which hid a prize; next, he would usually open a door that did not hold the prize. The contestant then had the option of switching from her chosen door to the remaining unopened door.
Should the contestant switch doors? If the host can be trusted, mathematically, the best strategy to increase the odds of winning is to switch doors. However, when Monty has the options of declaring the game over or opening one door and offering a switch, if the host should not be trusted-that is, Monty knows where the prize is and does not want the contestant to win it-, the contestant should not switch doors because Monty would only offer a switch if the contestant had already picked the winning door (Tor & Bazerman, 2003) .
The Monty Hall problem is an example of the "winner's curse" phenomenon of competitive bidding, a problem robust across auction form, market size, and subject population (Dyer, Kagel, & Levin, 1989) . The winner's curse is created when one side has much better information than the other side about the situation (Thaler, 1988) . We are all familiar with the expression "buyer beware," but our intuition has difficulty putting this idea into practice, and we ignore the hazards of making decisions based on asymmetric information. We naïvely ignore the need the importance of getting accurate information about important transactions. We undervalue a mechanic's unbiased evaluation of a used car, a professional inspector's assessment of a house, or an independent jeweler's assessment of a coveted gem.
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CYNICAL ERRORS
In certain situations, we are good at avoiding the naïve mistakes described above, as in the case of the author who was appropriately skeptical of the Manchester taxi driver's claim about a train strike. But we can also fall prey to the opposite error-being inappropriately cynical and distrustful. This type of error has been neglected in the decision-making literature (Liu & Wang, 2010) , relative to the abundant attention given to naïve errors. In this section, we examine the suboptimal outcomes that result from being too cynical, discuss some of the relevant new research in detail, and explore future directions in this literature.
When Cynicism Harms Outcomes
People may tend to be more wary of the risks of being too naïve, yet research has begun to document the ways in which we may be cynical of others' motivations and reasoning, both in interpersonal interactions and in the context of organizations. In the context of management, cynicism has been defined and treated in many different ways. Work on individual differences has considered cynicism as a personality disposition or trait (Graham, 1993; Pope et al., 1993) . For example, the results of studies of the behavior of monozygotic (identical) and dizygotic (fraternal) twins in trust games have suggested that trusting behavior and reciprocal trustworthiness are in part heritable, independent of the environment in which we are raised (Cesarini et al., 2008) . Our genetic endowment and the environment in which we learned to trust or distrust appear to determine our dispositional levels of trust and cynicism.
In an interesting demonstration of the surprising impact of our immediate environment on trust, Frank, Gilovich, and Regan (1993) considered whether self-interested economists with rational mindsets were indoctrinated to be self-interested through their study of economics, or whether people who were self-interested to begin become particularly attracted to the discipline.
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The authors offer evidence that mere exposure to the self-interested neoclassical economics model encourages more self-interested, cynical behavior in both economists and non-economists alike.
Other work on cynicism relates to beliefs about the social world, such as those regarding interactions between individuals or within groups and organizations (Andersson, 1996; Dean, Brandes, & Dharwadkar, 1998; O'Connell, Holzman, & Armandi, 1986; Reichers, Wanous, & Austin, 1997) . It may be less than surprising to learn that consumers are aware and suspicious of the persuasion and influence strategies used by marketers and advertisers (Freistad & Wright, 1994) , that the public has a growing distrust and cynicism toward public leaders and institutions (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997) , and that employees are frequently disillusioned by and distrusting of business organizations, executives, and others in the workplace, in what is termed "employee cynicism" (Andersson, 1996) or "organizational cynicism" (Wanous, Reichers, & Austin, 1997) .
Here, we limit our discussion to the literature on cynicism that focuses on how it breeds negative views of human nature (Leung, Tong, & Ho, 2004) and distrust of others' intentions and motives (Deutsch, 1960; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995) . As an example, consider this "hidden card game" between a seller and a buyer (Rubinstein, 2009; Ert, Creary, & Bazerman, 2011) :
A deck of 100 cards includes all values between $1 to $100, in dollar increments. The seller starts by randomly drawing two cards from the deck. After being told the value of the lower of the two cards, the buyer must decide whether to buy the two cards from the seller at a fixed cost of $100. The cards' value to the buyer is the sum of the two cards.
The seller is rewarded a fixed amount ($10) if the buyer buys the cards. Thus, the seller's 12 interest is to sell the cards regardless of their value. The buyer, on the other hand, only wants to buy the cards when they are valuable (when the sum of cards exceeds $100).
Simple analysis demonstrates that a risk-neutral buyer should buy the cards whenever the value of the lower card exceeds $33, since at $34, all values for the other card between $35 and $100 are equally likely, making the sum of the two cards anywhere between $69 and $134, for an expected value of $101.5 (just slightly above $100), again, all values being equally likely. Ert, Creary, and Bazerman (2011) examined how buyers react when they see that the lower card is worth $40, making all values for the combination of the two cards between $81 and $140 equally likely, for an expected value of $110.50. Without the opportunity to obtain any additional information, we argue that it is rational for the risk-neutral buyer to buy the cards. Ert, Creary, and Bazerman (2011) looked at buyer behavior in two different conditions.
In one condition, the seller was an automated computer, and the potential buyer had no opportunity for communication. In a second condition, the seller was another human being, and the two parties had the opportunity to interact via e-mail. While most buyers (78%) accepted the offer of a lower card of $40 from computer sellers, the acceptance rates dropped significantly (to 45%) when the offer came from a human seller who could communicate directly with the buyer.
The communication made the buyer cynical and prevented him from maximizing his expected probability by accepting the offer when the lower card was worth $40. As evidence of their cynicism, buyers wrote messages such as, "I think you're lying," and "Yea right, why should I believe you?" In the aggregate, cynicism worked against buyers. Moreover, the sellers strongly believed that communicating with buyers would help them close the deal (Ert, Creary, & 13 Bazerman, 2011), but they were wrong: cynicism turned out to be the main outcome of the communication.
In the hidden card game, potential buyers cynically assumed that they would be harmed by the seller's self-interested motives (Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998) . This phenomenon relates to work on trust, particularly the beliefs that trust inspires (Andersson, 1996) , defined as "confident, positive expectations regarding another's conduct" (Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998) or "the probability that one party attaches to cooperative behavior by other parties" (Hwang & Burgers, 1997) . By contrast, a cynical person will have more negative expectations of others and view them as egocentrically biased.
A cynical belief that another person is motivated primarily by self-interest can even trump evidence to the contrary. Critcher and Dunning (2010) find evidence that people tend to scrutinize and construe even selfless behavior in self-interested terms. On the flip side, we fail to dissect selfish behavior in the same manner by searching for selfless motivations. This results in an asymmetry: beliefs about selfless motivations resist evidence of the contrary, and beliefs about selfish motivations go unquestioned (Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2010) . Why the discrepancy?
When people withhold from trusting others, they usually lack opportunities to learn whether their trust would have reaped rewards. By contrast, when we offer our trust, the most salient learning occurs when the other party proves to be untrustworthy. Hence, this feedback asymmetry breeds growing cynicism.
Next, we explore our negative views about others and the potential consequences of such cynicism for negotiations, including both the direct effects (goals and standards) and indirect effects (assumptions and perspectives about the nature of others) that become the lens through which we view negotiation interactions.
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Cynical Errors in Negotiation
As in other contexts that involve competition and conflict, being too cynical can be costly in negotiation. Perhaps one of the most compelling historical examples is the American reaction to the Russian proposal for disarmament during the Cold War (Ross & Stillinger, 1991; Ross, 1995) .
American politicians devalued the proposal simply because it was offered by the other party, with suboptimal outcomes for both sides. While Ross and Stillinger showed the effect in controlled laboratory studies, former United States Congressman Floyd Spence (R-South Carolina) captured this type of cynicism when he noted: "I have had a philosophy for some time in regard to SALT [the proposed agreement], and it goes like this: the Russians will not accept a SALT treaty that is not in their best interest, and it seems to me that if it is their best interests, it can't be in our best interest" (Ross & Stillinger, 1991) .
In many cases, features inherent to the context of negotiation-including power asymmetries, uncertainty, disagreement on key terms and definitions, and egocentric reasoningcontribute to differences in construals or interpretations (Hsee, 1995; Wade-Benzoni, Tenbrunsel, & Bazerman, 1996) . Such conditions are ripe for mutual distrust, which in turn affects expectations and actual behavior. For example, Tenbrunsel (1999) discusses the prevalence of distrust and negative expectations of "the other side" in environmental-economic disputes (Hollis, 1996) .
When negotiators do not trust each other, they rely on distributive and competitive strategies, and they focus on getting concessions rather than on problem-solving, resulting in reduced information exchange (Kimmel, Pruitt, Magenau, Konar-Goldband, & Carnevale, 1980) and information concealment (Terhune, 1970) . Such negotiators also forgo the many benefits of trust, such as greater coordination (Bradach & Eccles, 1989) , cooperation (Ross & Wieland, 1996) , and revelation of more accurate information (Zand, 1972) . The evidence of the impact of 15 these changes on the joint outcomes of the negotiation is somewhat mixed, but withholding information is likely to lead to reciprocal perceptions of the other party as untrusting (Butler, 1991; Dore, 1987) , leading to further mistrust and withholding.
These negative expectations of others may be captured by "social cynicism" (Li, Zhou, & Leung, 2010) , which also harms outcomes in negotiation. By contributing to reduced satisfaction in individual relationships , reduced use of collaborative and compromising styles in conflict resolution (Bond, Leung, Au, Tong, & Chemonges-Nielson, 2004) , increased use of pressure and coercion (Fu, Kennedy, Tata, Yukl, Bond, & Peng, 2004) , and decreased interpersonal trust and cognitive flexibility (Singelis, Hubbard, Her, & An, 2003) , cynicism regarding others' motivations may become a self-fulfilling prophecy that leaves both sides worse off than would otherwise be the case. Kruger and Gilovich (1999) have demonstrated a basic "naïve cynicism," in which people in a number of different domains cynically believed that others would give biased estimates when assessing their contribution to joint outcomes, despite believing themselves to be immune to such bias and independent of whether or not the allocations actually were biased. This naïve cynicism likely has a host of consequences for negotiations, ranging from relationship discord to bargaining impasse. By consistently expecting others, but not themselves, to have biased motivations, people become "self-interest theorists" (Miller & Ratner, 1998) whose cynical expectations are not even met by those who do act in a self-serving manner. This cynicism may have roots in early childhood, as young children have been shown to assume that incorrect statements aligned with speakers' self-interests arise from the intent to deceive (Mills & Keil, 2004) .
These cynical assumptions extend beyond the estimates in contribution. For example, Krueger and Gilovich (1998) also have found that people tend to intuitively expect others to 16 overestimate their own abilities. In addition, the tendency to favor oneself when interpreting uncertain information may cause others to believe that we are intentionally misleading them or misrepresenting facts (Tenbrunsel, 1999; Tsay & Bazerman, 2009 ). If our assumptions of others' biases exceed their actual biases, social conflict, blame, and distrust will naturally follow. Given such effects, an excess of cynicism can become the rational ideal (Kramer, 1998) .
Similarly, naïve cynicism can crop up in perceptions of negotiation processes. When O'Connor and Adams (1999) asked novice negotiators to list all the actions they believe contribute to successful negotiations, they agreed that such interactions are necessarily competitive because parties hold incompatible interests. Like the naïve cynicism we hold about others' motivated biases, we expect "settlement to be difficult, intransigence to be likely, and outside assistance to be necessary" in negotiation (Tenbrunsel, 1995) . Uncertainty and power dynamics can exacerbate these tendencies. Tenbrunsel (1995) found that when a negotiator was uncertain about the information possessed by an opponent, the opponent was more likely to expect that negotiator to misrepresent their own information. In other research, Tenbrunsel and Messick (2001) found that expectations of misrepresentation grew more likely as power asymmetry increased.
Cynicism may also arise with the induction of a suspicious mindset (Oza, Srivastava, & Koukova, 2010) . The minimal ways in which this induction can be achieved hint at the ease with which people may become more vigilant about other parties during a negotiation. For example, Oza et al. (2010) activated knowledge about the potential influence of persuasion in bargaining tasks through a variety of simple methods, such as presenting readings about persuasion tactics or describing the other party as a sales expert.
Both objective outcomes and psychological factors influence how satisfied people are with bargaining outcomes (Neale & Bazerman, 1991; Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006) , and satisfaction influences the likelihood and quality of future interactions, as well as commitment to the negotiated agreement. Awareness of the influence of psychological factors such as opponent response time, emotions, and provision of reference prices can help people cope with persuasion attempts and tactics, yet it may leave us overly cynical about our counterparts.
In addition, cues can activate persuasion knowledge and a suspicious mindset (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997 ) that affect negotiators' satisfaction with bargaining outcomes and negative outcomes. For example, how interactions are framed-whether as "social dilemmas" or "ultimatum games"-can have a dramatic impact on decisions and cooperation (Larrick & Blount, 1997) . Such framing may change how ambiguous information is perceived; dyads set up as "competitors" focused more on the cynical aspects of interpersonal relationships when interpreting the same photos than did pairs of "cooperators" (Sermat, 1970) . Even surveillance systems meant to set standards and increase cooperation can change the focus of a decision frame from ethics to economics (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1998) , and from joint outcomes to individual outcomes. A suspicious mindset may result in guarded communication, with detrimental effects for the quality of stable long-term relationships (Larson, 1992) . Well-intentioned interactions may be perceived as influence tactics, leading to more opportunism, short-sighted strategies (Hwang & Burgers, 1997) , and suboptimal outcomes.
Beyond cynicism at the individual and dyadic levels of negotiation, groups of negotiators are also inclined to focus on negative aspects of others. Naquin and Kurtzberg (2009) find that due to the negativity bias (our tendency to give more weight to the negative aspects of something under evaluation) and the discontinuity effect (the tendency to interact more competitively with groups than with individuals), we focus most on the least trustworthy individual within a team when evaluating team-level trust. While average ratings of trust across individual members are higher 18 than that of the least trustworthy member, ratings of collective team-level trust are similar to those of the least trustworthy member. The least trustworthy group member's rating is most predictive of impasse rates in distributive negotiations and joint gains in integrative negotiations.
Finally, some researchers distinguish cynicism from distrust by noting that cynicism includes not only belief (or, in the case of mistrust, a lack of belief) but also the affective component of disillusionment (Andersson, 1996; Andersson & Bateman, 1997) . While both distrust and cynicism may be disentangled into global versus situational components, this line of work suggests that cynicism is broader in nature than distrust, as it encompasses not only expectations but also negative feelings toward people, groups, or objects.
This idea hints at implications for the combined effects of distrust and emotions on negotiation strategies. Recent research has found that emotions can affect many factors of negotiation performance and outcomes, including bargaining tactics (Carnevale & Isen, 1986) , concessions (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006) , and individual and joint gains (Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997) . In one line of work (Lerner & Keltner, 2000) , anger and compassion were found to have different influences on negotiation behavior and goals via trust. Distrust increases the perceived importance of competitive goals but is negatively and weakly associated with cooperative goals (Liu & Wang, 2010) , thus reducing the likelihood of maximizing joint gains through open communication.
Cynical Errors in Auctions and Economic Games
When do people trust too much or too little relative to what a rational economic analysis would suggest? The "trust game" can be used to diagnose an individual's attitudes regarding trust relative to a group standard (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995) . The structure is as follows:
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One individual is assigned to be the sender, who decides how much money out of an initial endowment (as set by the experimenter) to send to another individual (the receiver). The experimenter multiplies the amount the sender gives to the receiver (typically by three, based on Berg et al., 1995) and this new amount is in the receiver's hands. The receiver subsequently decides how much of the money received to send back to the sender. Sender and receiver roles are randomly assigned in the trust game, and full rules of the game (including the initial endowment, the size of the multiplier, and the sequence in which decisions will be made) are disclosed to both parties at the start of the game. The structure of the game allows us to experimentally detect trust (through the amount the sender entrusts with the receiver) and trustworthiness (through the amount the receiver sends back to the sender in reciprocation).
From a rational perspective, in a game where roles are anonymous and interaction is limited to a single round, a rational sender should anticipate that the receiver will not send back any money; therefore, the sender should send nothing. Yet trust and trustworthiness are consistently present in such games, even in this stripped-down, single-shot, anonymous version.
Senders on average will give receivers more than half of their initial endowments to be tripled by the experimenter. Receivers on average reciprocate by giving more than a third of the amount they receive to senders; hence, senders are typically rewarded for their initial trust (see Camerer, 2003, for a detailed review).
Across studies, less than ten percent of senders give receivers nothing, and less than a quarter of receivers give senders nothing back (Berg et al., 1995; Croson & Buchan, 1999; Johansson-Stenman et al, 2005) . These effects are similar for trust games conducted in the 20 United States, China, Japan, and Korea (Croson & Buchan, 1999) . Furthermore, gender has no significant effect on senders' trust behavior; however, female receivers do tend to reciprocate significantly more of their wealth (hence demonstrating more trustworthy behavior) than males do in all observed contexts (Croson & Buchan, 1999) .
Trust persists even in high-stakes environments. One study conducted in rural Bangladeshi villages gave senders initial endowments worth almost 5% of the gross national income per capita (Johansson-Stenman, Mahmud, & Martinsson, 2005) . Senders on average still gave more than a third of their initial endowments to anonymous receivers, and receivers on average gave more than a third of what they received back to senders. Even with such meaningful, life-changing amounts of money at stake, just three percent of senders sent nothing to receivers, and nine percent of receivers sent nothing back to senders. Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2009) use the trust game to investigate whether or not people trust too much or too little; they exploit the trust game's design to compare counterfactual outcomes (i.e., what would have happened had everyone played with a participant at the group median levels of trust and trustworthiness) as a benchmark against actual performance of senders and receivers. They found evidence of both too much trust (given participants' expectations of the trustworthiness of others) and too little trust (given their tolerance for risk). Senders hugely underestimated the trustworthiness of receivers and gave up earnings they would have received had they been less cynical. Senders also seemed to exhibit too much trust based on their expressed tolerance of risk (Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2009) . From a sender's perspective, a one-shot trust game can be considered to be equivalent to a risky bet (with risk calculated as the anticipated trustworthiness of any average receiver). Prior work has established that a trust decision entails an additional risk premium added to the pre-existing risk tolerance of receivers-apparently to 21 alleviate any possible trust betrayal (the pain of unreciprocated trust), which seems to hurt more than losing a statistically equivalent risky bet (Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004) . In Fetchenhauer and Dunning's experiments (2009) , despite participant cynicism regarding the untrustworthy nature of receivers, senders were more likely to gamble their money by giving it to a receiver they believed to be untrustworthy than by entering a lottery with higher odds than those they believed they would receive from the rare trustworthy receiver. Thus, from a risk perspective, despite harboring cynical views that most people are untrustworthy and despite demanding a premium for the possible pain of trust betrayal, people still appear to trust more than their risk appetites predict. Berks, Carpenter, and Verhoogen (2003) investigated the impact of participants playing both roles in the trust game with different partners. One prediction is that forcing people to take both perspectives will increase levels of trust and trustworthiness. The authors found the opposite result: participants who played both roles actually exhibited less trust and reciprocal trustworthiness, though only when the two-role structure of the game was made clear before rounds were played. This result appears to suggest that priming a rational game-strategic mindset by having participants consider their potential income in two rounds with different partners increased rather than decreased self-interested motives.
FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE
There is no easy answer as to whether being trusting or cynical is the best strategy. It is clear, however, that you would be wise to think carefully about the decisions and motives of the other party so that you can understand what the problem looks like from his or her perspective. This may help you identify when reasons to trust exist and when you have reason to be cynical.
In this section, we propose several strategies as solutions to both naïve and cynical errors.
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Learning and Understanding through Examples
Many researchers have tried to show that errors of naiveté are not easily eliminated with experience. The winner's curse and the failure to appropriately adjust behavior in light of others' decisions have been shown to persist even with many trials and with very strong feedback (Grosskopf, Bereby-Meyer, & Bazerman, 2007) . More promising is research suggesting that the costs of these naïve errors may be ameliorated by comparing and contrasting choices within and across parallel related problems, which leads to a better understanding of the Acquiring a Company problem (Idson, Chugh, Bereby-Meyer, Moran, Grosskopf, & Bazerman, 2004) . This research is consistent with earlier work on analogical learning (Loewenstein, Thompson, & Gentner, 1999) . Neale and Bazerman (1983) found that individuals who had a greater tendency to think about the perspective of others were more successful in laboratory negotiations. This focus on the perspective of the other party allowed better predictions of opponents' goals, expectations, and reservation points. While taking the perspective of the other party is important, most individuals lack sufficient perspective-taking ability (Bazerman & Neale, 1983; Bernstein & Davis, 1982; Davis, 1981) . Overall, negotiators tend to act as if their opponents were inactive parties in the negotiation and they systematically ignore valuable information that is available. Bazerman and Neale (1982) suggest that training mechanisms should be developed to increase the perspective-taking ability of negotiators. This prescription is consistent with the literature on negotiator role reversal, which suggests that having each bargainer verbalize the other side's viewpoint increases the likelihood of a negotiated resolution (Pruitt, 1981) . Similarly, encouraging negotiators to take their opponents' perspective should be a central focus of mediators.
Perspective Taking
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In competitive contexts, a healthy skepticism that treats counterparts as having several possible motives, both benevolent and malevolent (Fein, 1996; Sinaceur, 2010) , may enhance information search and integrative agreements. On the other hand, an awareness of others' perspectives may also help counter cynical errors. Tenbrunsel (1999) suggests that by focusing on optimal solutions in which power comes from coordination and creative solutions rather than control and enforcement, integrative outcomes, cooperative behavior, and greater trust become more likely.
The Role of Communication, Information, and Relationships
Economic analysis shows that it is quite possible for sophisticated, fully rational negotiators to reach an impasse despite having a sizeable zone of possible agreement within both of their reservation values-i.e., less than the most the buyer will pay and more than the least the seller will accept (Myerson, & Satterthwaite, 1983) . The seller may try to beat her reservation price if she thinks the probability of the buyer paying more is reasonably high. Similarly, the buyer may try to shave more off his reservation price if he thinks there is a good chance of getting such a concession from the seller. Due to each side's strategic thinking about how to maximize their respective payoffs, it is quite possible for rational parties to reach an impasse despite having a zone of possible agreement.
When communication between parties is strong, however, there are several ways they can avoid the impasse that such strategic concerns foster (Bazerman, Gibbons, Thompson, & Valley, 1998) . Because negotiators care about their reputation and the outcomes of others, they may relax their strategic concerns and improve the quality of the information exchange. Negotiators correctly believe that acting with integrity increases the likelihood that the other side will respond with integrity; as such, they may regard open and honest communication as good 24 investments. Finally, negotiators tend to view impasse as a negative event. Many are willing to forego some expected financial benefit in order to reach agreement.
Parties may be more trusting than we might expect from a fully rational analysis, and strong communication plays a critical role in fostering this trust. When different interests are represented by multiple people, one way to establish a foundation for high-quality communication is to clearly target specific negotiators, thus allowing repeated exposure to the same individuals (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995) , which would foster a climate of trust, greater certainty, and greater likelihood of a shared understanding of the negotiation (Tenbrunsel, 1999) . A better shared framework helps parties avoid framing a negotiation as a dispute or zerosum game, therefore increasing trust (Das & Teng, 1998) .
Similarly, Kruger and Gilovich (1999) found that a cooperative, in-group orientation can lessen the assumption that others are motivationally biased. This was also found in those who have satisfying pre-existing relationships, such as spouses. On the other hand, power differences and a focus on power-based resolution are likely to help signal more myopic interests (Tenbrunsel, 1999) . Thus, one possible way to help ameliorate our derogatory assumptions about others is to take advantage of the potentially bidirectional influence between the quality of the relationship and the level of naïve cynicism used to evaluate others.
Both individual motivations and the rules of the negotiation can also impact the effects of cynicism. Negotiators' social motives and punitive capabilities both affect trust, behavior, and joint outcomes. Collaboratively motivated negotiators communicate more openly and exhibit greater trust for other parties than do those with a competitive orientation, resulting in solutions with mutual benefits (Beersma & De Dreu, 1999; Weingart, Bennett, & Brett, 1993) . However, those with cooperative motives are more likely to develop trust, communicate openly, share information, 25 and achieve better joint outcomes only when the structure of the negotiation allows trust to develop (De Dreu, Giebels, & Van de Vliert, 1998) .
Finally, in our electronically connected economy, there are many ways to establish a reputation without necessarily relying on intuition about someone's trustworthiness. For instance, the actively used reference system on CouchSurfing.org facilitates trust by allowing members to vouch for the safety and goodwill of other members. When approaching new counterparts, it would be wise to consider means of communication-both in person and online-that can improve trust and reduce cynicism to create greater value for society at large.
Discussion
Some of us err too much toward trust; others too much toward cynicism. To determine your own predisposition, consider whether you trust in the absence of information and whether you distrust despite positive information about another person's potential trustworthiness. If you trust in the former scenario, you may expose yourself to unnecessary risks if you encounter untrustworthy counterparts. If you distrust in the latter scenario, your stubborn cynicism may lead you to suboptimal outcomes in interactions requiring trust. Through our examples and review of both naïve and cynical errors, we hope to contribute to a better understanding of the strategic behavior of others, without destroying opportunities for trust building.
